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By Jonathan G. Blattmachr and Mitchell M. Gans
technique, particularly for
busiowners
of closely
ne popular
estate held
planning
nesses, has been the recapitalization
of a business so that the previous
business owner holds interests which
tend to be stabilized or frozen over
time (such as preferred stock or
equivalent interest in a partnership)
and other family members (typically
those in younger generations or entities on their behalf) hold interests in
the enterprise which tend to capture
its future appreciation (such as common stock or-equivalent interest in a
partnership). These transactions are
typically called "freezes."

Over the past several years, the
Internal Revenue Service has attempted to spoil the effects of those
freezes. Even before the enactment of
the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation
Act of 1987, P.L. 100-203 ("OBRA"),
Section 2036 of the Internal Revenue
Code (the "Code") required inclusion
in a decedent's estate of property
transferred prior to death in which
the decedent retained an income interest or enjoyment,.but the Service
has not been successful in being able
to have freeze transactions treated as
falling under that section. Now
OBRA amends Section 2036 by
adding new Section 2 036(c) to pro-

vide the Service with some "antifreeze."
Effective for estates of decedents
dying after 1987 and with respect to
transactions after December 17, 1987,
Section 2036(c) provides that if the
decedent holds a substantial interest
in an enterprise and had previously
in effect transferred property having
a disproportionately large share of
the potential appreciation of his or
her interest in the enterprise while
retaining a disproportionately large
share in the income of, or rights in,
the enterprise, then the retention of
the retained interest (i.e., the disproportionately large share of income or
rights) is considered to be retention of
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the enjoyment of the transferred
property. Hence, the transferred
property is included in the transferor's estate.
Examples may help to clarify how
the provision is supposed to work. A
man who owns all outstanding preferred and common shares in a corporation gives 50% of the common
and 50% of the preferred stock to his
son. Because the owner did not transfer a disproportionately large share of
the appreciation, the new provision
does not apply and none of the transferred stock is includable in his estate. See example in House Report
No. 100-391, at p. 1044. However, if
he transferred 80% of the common
and only 20% of the preferred stock,
the new provision would apply. The
Conference Report (House Report
100-495) states that only 60 of the 80
common shares are includable under
the new provision.
"In Effect" Transfers
In contrast to other provisions of
Section 2036, new Section 2036(c) applies not just to "transfers" but also
where the decedent "in effect" transfers the interest. Although the statute
does not provide a definition of transfer, one is set forth in the Conference
Report. According to the report, it
encompasses but is not limited to all
transactions where property is
passed to or conferred upon another,
regardless of the means or device employed. Hence, "transfer" would appear to include all gifts, sales and
exchanges, whether or not tax-free
for income tax purposes. "In effect,"
however, is not defined or explained
in either the statute or any report. The
phrase may suggest that it is used to
cover what might be treated as indirect transfers such as through an intermediary entity.
For example, a woman owns
100% of the common shares (the only
type outstanding) in a corporation. It
adopts a plan of recapitalization under which the woman exchanges her
common shares for preferred ones
having a value equal to the exchanged common shares. Her children subscribe for the "new"
common shares, at their current fair
market value. The preferred stock
has a preference for dividends and
payment upon liquidation of the corporation compared to the common
stock. If the woman holds the preMay/June

ferred shares until her death, the
common shares, owned by her children, will be included in her estate.
Even though she did not directly sell
or give shares to her children, she
probably will be regarded as "in effect" making a transfer triggering the
new provision.
In the example, it may be appropriate to conclude that the woman
"in effect" made the transfer because
she alone controlled the corporation
which was recapitalized. However, if
she alone did not control sufficient
interests to cause the corporation to
be recapitalized, it would be difficult
to contend that she in effect made the
transfer of stock to her children.
Moreover, if she did have control but
owned less than 100% of the common shares, she should be treated as
the "in effect transferor" only over a
proportionate part of the common
shares her children acquired from the
corporation.
The retention of the income interest apparently need not occur
through the ownership of preferred
stock. It would appear to cover also a
debt instrument. If the statute is interpreted to be applicable to debt instruments, it might create difficulties
for a fairly typical situation where a
parent provides a child with financing for a new business venture in
which the child owns the common
stock and from which the parent receives a debt instrument. In such circumstances, it might be prudent to
either charge a low interest rate or to
forego interest in order to avoid a
possible argument by the Service that
the father retained the enterprise's
income. Of course, it could be argued
that the interest should be imputed
but Section 7872 presumably would
be applicable for income and gift tax
purposes in any event.
Possibly even an employment
contract under which a former common shareholder is entitled to salary
payments or other forms of compensation (whether they are deferred arrangements of otherwise) might constitute a retained income interest in
the enterprise. But if such compensation is reasonable in relation to the
services rendered, the existence of
the employment contract should not
trigger application of the new provision. Note also that the mere retention of income is not sufficient; the
substantial interest in the enterprise
and transfer of a disproportionately

large share of potential appreciation
elements of the new section also
must be present.
No "Regular" Bona Fide Sale
Exception for Family
Prior to OBRA, Section 2036(a)
provided that pre-death transfers for
full and adequate consideration in
money or money's worth were beyond the scope of estate tax inclusion
under Section 2036 even if the transferor retained an income interest in or
enjoyment from the property until
death. But OBRA eliminates this
bona fide transfer exception under
the new rule for a transfer to a family
member. Hence, in the example
above, even though the woman received preferred stock equal in value
to her common shares and even
though her children paid full fair
market value for the common shares
after the recapitalization, the children's common shares apparently
should be included in her estate.
New Section 2036(c)(5) provides,
however, that in lieu of applying Section 2043, "appropriate adjustments"
are to be made for the value of the
retained interest. The Conference Report suggests that this means that
"the amount included in the estate
will be reduced by the value of the
consideration received by the decedent." Although that presumably
means that the decedent's estate will
be reduced by the amount the decedent received for an asset, it is not
certain if it will allow an offset for "in
effect" transfers, such as where family members pay value to the business for the interests they acquire.
For example, a father and his
daughter own 50% each of the common shares (50 each) in a business. In
a recapitalization, the father exchanges 10 of his common shares for
10 preferred shares of equal value
from the company. Under the "in effect" language of Section 2036(c), apparently this exchange may be treated as a transaction falling under the
new provision. As a consequence, the
increase in the daughter's ownership
of common stock (increasing from
50% to 56%) will be includable in her
father's estate. It does not appear that
all of the common shares of the
daughter are includable in the father's estate but only those which,
through the transaction with the corporation, increased the percentage

ownership of common shares of the
daughter.
If the same transaction had been
with a non-family member, it would
have been exempted from the provision because it was for full and adequate consideration in money or
money's worth. It is important, however, to note that Section 2036(c) does
apply if a sale to a non-family member is made for less than full and
adequate consideration in money or
money's worth. Where a sale is, or is
treated as being, made for less than
the full and adequate consideration
in money or money's worth, the
amount included in the estate should
be reduced, in any event, by the value
of the consideration received by the
decedent.

preferred stock is still worth $1,000
but the common stock is worth $10
million. In that year he gives away
the common stock to his family but
keeps the preferred stock until he
dies. Assuming that the preferred
stock represents a disproportionately
large share of income, Section
2036(c), as literally written, may operate to cause all the common shares to

"It is unfortunate that
the statute is not based
on relative values."
be included in his gross estate. However, as discussed below, perhaps the
result should turn on what percentage of income the preferred stock is
entitled to.

The Part Included-An Overview
Unanswered Questions
The part of the transferred interest included in the estate apparently
is based on the relationship of the
retained interest held at death compared to the interest transferred. For
instance, in one of the examples
above, a man transferred 80 of his 100
common and 20 of his 100 preferred
shares to his son. The Conference
Report concludes that only 60 of the
transferred common shares are includable in the estate.
Suppose that more than three
years prior to death the man transfers
30 more of the preferred shares to his
son-owning 20 common and 50 preferred at death. This should mean
that only 30 shares of the common
stock transferred to the child should
be included in the estate even
though, as explained below, for purposes of determining whether he
holds a 10% or greater interest at
death he is treated as holding the
income stream and voting rights of
Section
under
his
children
2036(c)(3)(A). Similarly, if he transferred 60 of the retained 80 preferred
shares after the initial transfer but
more than three years before death,
none of his son's common shares
should be in his estate, because at
death he does not hold interests having a disproportionately large share
of income in the enterprise.
It is unfortunate that the statute is
not based on relative values. For example, a man in 1968 formed a corporation capitalizing it with $2,000$1,000 paid for preferred stock and
$1,000 for common stock. In 1988 the

Neither the new statute nor the
committee reports deal in any detail
with the situation where the retained
income (or rights) constitute less than
100% of the enterprise's income
stream. As noted above, the Conference Report does posit a hypothetical where the transferor retained
some (80 shares) of the preferred and
some (20 shares) of the common, and
the conclusion reached is that the
transferor would be required to include 60 shares of common in her
gross estate. But no guidance is provided for the situations where the
transferor has retained a portion of
the preferred and no common or
where the transferor has retained all
of the preferred but where the preferred is entitled to less than 100% of
the enterprise's income stream.
The first such situation should be
easy to resolve. To illustrate, assume
that a father has transferred all of his
common and 50% of his preferred to
his daughter. It would seem that the
retention of 50% of the preferred
should trigger an inclusion in his estate of 50% of the common. He has
divided or "split" the income from
the appreciation with respect to 50%
of the shares. The other 50% of the
common (the potential appreciation)
is not split from the income (the preferred) but is in fact owned by the
daughter, who also owns 50% of the
preferred. This analysis is consistent
with, if not dictated by, the 80/20
hypothetical set forth in the Conference Report.

In the second situation, where the
transferor has retained all of the preferred but not all of the enterprise's
income stream, one can only infer the
result Congress contemplated. Consider, for example, a mother who
transfers all of the common, having a
value of $9 million, to her son while
retaining all of the preferred, which
has a par value of $1 million and
provides a dividend of 10%. Assume
further that the enterprise earns $1
million per year, which represents a
rate of return of 10% on the value of
its assets. It would seem that the
mother has retained a "substantial
interest," within the meaning of subsection (c)(3)(A), in that she is entitled
to receive 10% of the enterprise's income (she will be entitled to a dividend of $100,000, which is 10% of the
enterprise's income of $1 million).
Should all of the common stock be
included in the mother's estate at her
death by virtue of her retention of the
preferred? Probably not. Only 10% of
the appreciation component, i.e., the
common, should be included in her
estate, inasmuch as she retained a
10% income interest in the enterprise.
In effect, she split the appreciation
component from the income component only with respect to that 10%
interest.
A similar issue could arise with
respect to voting rights. Where, for
example, a parent retains all. of the
preferred stock (which represents
10% of all voting rights in the enterprise) and none of the common (having transferred it to some member of
his family), it would seem, by a parity
of logic, that 10% of the common
should be included in the parent's
estate.
In those situations where the retaining preferred is entitled to, for
example, 20% of the enterprise's income and 30% of the vote, how much
should be included-20% or 30% of
the common? It would seem that 30%
should be included. After all, if the
transferor had simply retained 30%
of the vote, 30% of the common
would be includable; the retention of
the additional right to 20% of the
income certainly should not produce
a lesser amount to include.
Another issue that is very likely to
arise concerns a change in the value
of the preferred and the common.
More specifically, what portion of the
appreciation component (the comProbate and Property

mon) will be included where the
transferor has retained 100% of the
enterprise's income through ownership of all of the preferred if, at the
time of death, the income inherent in
the preferred represents only a portion of the enterprise's income?
To illustrate, assume that at the
time of the recapitalization the transferor retains all of the preferred with
a value of $1 million and a non-participating dividend of 10%, having
transferred all of the common to a
family member. Assume further that
the enterprise generates an annual
income of $100,000. As a consequence, the transferor has retained
the right to all of the enterprise's income through the ownership of the
preferred. Were the transferor to die
before the value of the common or
preferred changed, the statute would
clearly require that value of all of the
common be included in the estate.
But if, at the time of the transferor's
death, the annual income of the enterprise has risen to $1 million and
consequently the value of the common has increased to $9 million,
what portion of the common should
be included in the transferor's estate?

"Another issue that is
very likely to arise
concerns a change in the

value of the preferred
and the common."
Though it is arguable that the
statute would require that all of the
common be included, this result
seems anomalous. After all, at the
time of the transferor's death she
only had the right to 10% of the enterprise's income. As suggested
above, if she had retained 10% of the
income at the outset and if the value
had remained constant until her
death, only 10% of the common
should be included. In short, it would
seem more appropriate to determine
the percentage of the appreciation
(the common) to be included based
upon the percentage of income "controlled" as of death, rather than to
make this determination at the inception of the recapitalization and to
completely disregard the subsequent
changes in income, value and the
percentage of enterprise income controlled by the transferor.
The argument that the determinaMay/June

tion should be made at death can be
buttressed by a hypothetical involving the retention of voting stock. Assume that a transferor retains, immediately after the recapitalization,
all of the preferred, which represents
100% of the voting rights in the enterprise. Assume further that he or she
transfers all of the common to a family member. If the transferor were to
die, it would seem that all of the common should be included in the estate.
If, however, the transferor were to
consent to an amendment to the corporate documents whereby 75% of
the vote with respect to the enterprise
passed over to the owners of the common, it would seem that only 25% of
the common should be includable in
the transferor's estate. It is not likely
that the Service could successfully argue that, by virtue of the fact that the
transferor retrained 100% of the vote
at inception, all of the common must
be included. It would seem, however,
that if the amendment to the corporate documents occurred within three
years of the transferor's death, all of
the common would be includable.
This would suggest that the portion of the enterprise's income or vote
controlled by the transferor at the
time of death should be determinative of the portion of the common to
be included. Where, however, the
percentage of the vote controlled by
the transferor decreases during the
last three years of the transferor's life,
it would perhaps be appropriate to
make the determination as of the date
(during the last three years) on which
he owned the highest percentage of
the vote.
Should this construction of the
three year rule in the voting rights
context similarly apply in the context
of retained income? Probably not.
The three year rule is only triggered
where there has been a "transfer of
the retained interest" within the
three year period. While in the voting
context it may be appropriate to view
the amendment to the corporate documents as such a transfer, the mere
fluctuation in the percentage of retained income that occurs by reason
of a change in the total income of the
enterprise should not be viewed as a
transfer. Thus it would seem logical
to determine the portion of common
to be included in the context of retained income on the basis of the
percentage of enterprise income held
at the time of transferor's death.

Transfers Within Three Years
of Death
Since 1982, Section 2035(d)(2) has
provided that if a property interest
which otherwise would cause inclusion of an asset in the estate under
Section 2036 is transferred within
three years of death, the asset is included in the estate. New Section
2036(c)(4) expressly provides that
any transfer of the retained interest
(which would cause the transferred
interest holding the disproportionately large share of appreciation to be
includable in the estate under Section
2036(c) ) within three years of death
is treated as a transfer causing the
transferred interest to be includable
under Section 2035.
It is uncertain whether or how the
new rule may apply where the transferred interest (having the disproportionately large share of potential appreciation) is sold or otherwise disposed of, whether outside or inside
the three year period. Suppose, for
instance, that in the example above
where the father exchanges some of
his common shares for preferred
ones (thereby increasing the percentage of common shares owned by his
fellow shareholder daughter), the
daughter sold all or a part of her
shares. No guidelines are provided as
to whether the shares she sold or the
proceeds she received in the sale are
includable in her father's estate. The
Internal Revenue Service has taken
the position that the actual assets
transferred within three years of
death, whether held at death by the
transferee or not, was the property
includable in the decedent's estate
where Section 2035 applies. Rev. Rul.
72-282, 1972-1 C.B. 306.
No Delay in Timing of Gift
The new provision has no gift tax
analogue. As a consequence, whether
the transfer is for full and adequate
consideration (to a family member)
or by gift, transactions occurring later
(such as selling the retained interest
more than three years prior to death
in order to avoid application of the
new rule) would not appear to postpone the timing of the initial "gift"
nor result in a later gift when that sale
occurs. That means that the new
provision may not necessarily stop
freezes. It only causes the family to
take an additional risk of insuring

that all appropriate steps (such as a
sale of the retained interest) are taken
well before death.
Indeed, it would seem that taxpayers who were inclined to effect
the freeze in the past will be just as
willing to do so in the future, except
that they will probably do so in two
steps. The first step, as under the old
law, would be to recapitalize the corporation in order to create common
and preferred. The second step
"...

taxpayers who were

inclined to effect the
freeze in the past will be
just as willing to do so
in the future, except that
they will probably do so
in two steps."
would be to gift the preferred away
many years after effecting the first
step. If this is done and if the gift of
the preferred is made more than
three years prior to the donor's death,
the new provision will not apply to
the common. Consequently, all of the
appreciation accruing to the common
after the adoption of the recapitalization would be excluded from the donor's gift tax and estate tax base. In
short, taxpayers would be well advised to do this kind of recapitalization as early as possible, recognizing
that a gift of the preferred, if made
timely vis-a-vis the three year rule,
would have the effect, as under the
old law, of excluding all post-recapitalization appreciation accruing
to the common. Even if the three year
rule is not avoided, there is no real
down side in that the new provision
would apply and all post-recapitalization appreciation would be included, just as if the freeze had not
been attempted.
Meaning of "Potential
Appreciation" and
"Income" Uncertain
Although potential appreciation
and income are not defined in the Act
or reports, the Conference Report defines "disproportionately large share
of potential appreciation" as any
share of appreciation in the enterprise bigger than the share of appreciation borne by the property retained by the transferor.

It seems that the Section is aimed
at potential appreciation rather than
actual appreciation. On the other
hand, the words of the statute suggest that it is retention of a disproportionately large share of actual (as
opposed to potential)income which is
covered by Section 2036(c). Unfortunately, the provision does not specify
when the determination is made as to
whether or not the transferor has
retained a disproportionately large
share of income or rights.
Although it might appear relatively simple to determine which interests in the enterprise are the ones
holding a disproportionately large
share of potential appreciation, that
may not be so in all cases. Suppose,
for example, that the preferred stock
received in a recapitalization contains
a special feature such as the right to
receive all appreciation once the new
common shareholders receive a certain multiple of current value. The
common shares prior to recapitalization are worth $1 million. In the recapitalization, the former common
shareholder receives preferred shares
having a fair market value of $1 million and that shareholder's children
subscribe for and pay the corporation
full fair market value for the new
common shares, now worth $500,000.
The preferred stock is entitled to the
first $1 million of liquidation proceeds, the common stock is entitled to
the next $5 million of proceeds and
the preferred stock is entitled to all
proceeds above $6 million. In that
case it is uncertain which type of
stock holds the disproportionately
large share of potential appreciation.
Neither "income" nor "disproportionately large share of income" is
defined or explained in the statute or
reports. Income may cover the regular distribution of earnings or profits
of the enterprise and, perhaps, stock
dividends. It might also cover the use
of an asset which does not produce
current "income." It may not cover
liquidation proceeds whether or not
treated as taxable dividends under
Section 302.
Family
Section 2036(c)(3)(B) defines
"family" as the spouse, any lineal descendant, parent or grandparent of
the decedent (or the decedent's
spouse) and the spouse of any of the

foregoing. Relationship by legal
adoption is treated as a relationship
by blood. Also, an individual and the
individual's spouse are treated as one
person under Section 2036(c)(3)(C).
This latter provision means, for example, that the statute apparently
cannot be avoided by recapitalizing
the company and having the former
common shareholder's spouse receive preferred stock while the former shareholder's children subscribe
for the common stock.
Note that siblings and their descendants are not included in the definition of family. Hence, transfers to
them will not cause the property to be
included in the decedent's estate if
the transfers are for full and adequate
consideration in money or money's
worth.

In order for the new provision to
apply, the decedent must hold at
death a substantial interest in an enterprise. Substantial interest is a 10%
or greater income interest in or right
in the enterprise. It seems, although it
is by no means certain, that this condition may be determined as of the
decedent's death as opposed to the
time of the transfer. However, if the
10% or greater income or rights interest is the same as the retainedinterest,
then the specific transfer within three
years of death rule would appear as a
practical matter to apply to the substantial interest requirements of the
statute too. For purposes of the substantial interest at death test, income
stream and rights or interests include
those indirectly held by the decedent
and those directly and indirectly held
by the family.
Rights
Although the statute does not define the term "rights"-which, like
income, if held in a disproportionate
manner in the enterprise, can cause
inclusion in the estate-it is defined
in the Conference Report as including voting rights, conversion rights,
liquidation rights, warrants, options
and other rights of value. Neither the
Committee Reports nor the statute
makes it clear whether the retention
of voting rights in a fiduciary capacity
will trigger that provision. Compare
Section 2036(b), where Congress has
Probate and Property

made clear its intent that the statute
should apply to voting rights even if
held in a fiduciary capacity. The absence of a similar statement with respect to Subsection (c) suggests that,
perhaps, voting rights held in a fiduciary capacity will not trigger application of Subsection (c).
Enterprise
The legislative development of
the statute and the words used in new
Section 2036(c) suggest that "enterprise" covers an interest in a business
only, even though the statute contains no definition. Indeed, the
House Report defined it as a business
in any form whether it be through a
corporation, partnership or proprietorship. However, the Conference Report states that it includes
"a business or other property which
may produce income or gain." The
Conference Report definition could
be read as covering every type of
property interest-as every property
may produce income or gain. It seems
as though this definition probably
was expanded to cover intermediate
entities, such as where all interests in
a business are placed in a trust and
then the interests in the trust are
sliced up into income and appreciation parts or to cover the use of holding companies even though they are
not businesses for certain purposes,
such as Section 6166. Indeed, if "enterprise" were construed to cover all
interests in property of all kinds, then
a person might never be able to give
property away to a family memberbecause under the new rule the transferor is treated as holding the income
and voting power of family members.
In other words, Section 2036(c)
would swallow, in large measure,
Section 2036(a).
It seems relatively certain that income and voting interests transferred
to family members (other than a
spouse) are treated as interests retained by the decedent under Section
2036(c)(1)(B) only for purposes of determining if the transferor holds at
death a 10% or greater income or
voting power interest. The result apparently is different for transfers to a
spouse. As explained above, an individual and the individual's spouse
are treated as one person. If enterprise were construed to mean all
property interests, one spouse might
never be able to create a lifetime trust,
May/June

or possibly make any gift at all, for
the other without having it included
in the spouse's estate.
For example, a woman creates a
lifetime trust to pay the income to her
husband for life with remainder to
charity and funds it with treasury
bonds. If this arrangement is treated
as an "enterprise," the trust assets
may be included in the woman's estate because she will be deemed,
through her husband's income interest, to hold a greater than 10% income interest in the enterprise, and
treated as having transferred a disproportionately large share of the potential appreciation (the remainder
for charity) while retaining (by reason of her husband's income interest)
a disproportionately large share of
the income. The result would apply
whether the trust qualified for the gift
tax marital deduction or not and possibly would apply to outright transfers to a spouse. It should be concluded that the result is too extreme
and, except for business interests, the
new provision will not apply.
Overall Scope of Provision
It is important to note that in
order for the anti-freeze provision to
apply, three conditions must be met.
First, the decedent must hold, or be
treated through family ownership as
holding, a substantial interest in the
enterprise although it is not certain
whether this is determined at the
time of transfer or at death. Second,
the decedent must have made a
transfer of property having a disproportionately large share of potential
appreciation in his or her interest in
the enterprise while, third, retaining
(or apparently transferring to his or
her spouse) a disproportionately
large share of the income of or rights
in the enterprise. Where, for example,
the common shares held by one person (even a family member) participate in income and voting rights
proportionately with the preferred
shares, the statute should not apply
even if the preferred shares do not
share ratably or proportionately with
potential appreciation in the common shares. Hence, if the stock "retained" by the former common
shareholder only has a preference
upon liquidation but not the dividends, the new provision should not
apply. Although recapitalizations involving such "hybrid" securities may

not achieve all of the benefits which
other forms of freezes have achieved
in the past, the new transactions
should provide a way to shift significant appreciation while allowing the
former shareholder to participate in
income.
New Enterprises,
Joint Purchases and GRITs
It appears that the statute is aimed
only at a circumstance where the decedent has been stripped of potential
appreciation that he once held. As a
result, it should not apply to new
enterprises as where a new business
is formed and one person buys common stock and another buys prethe
ferred. Where, however,
decedent purchases the preferred
and as part of the same transaction
makes a gift of money to enable the
donee to purchase the common, it
would seem arguable that the decedent has "in effect" made a transfer
of the common and that therefore the
new provision could apply.
Likewise, the statute should not
apply to "joint purchases" in which
one person purchases the remainder
interest and another person purchases a life estate or a term of years
in the property. However, it probably
would cover the sale of a remainder
interest in an enterprise even if the
remainder were purchased for the
current value of the entire asset.
The provision should have no
new impact on grantor retained income trusts (GRIT's), even if funded
with interests in an enterprise, under
which the grantor retains the right to
income for a term with remainder
over to others. Such a trust would
have been includable under the previous version of Section 2036 if the
income interest is held by the grantor
until death.
Summary
In summary, the new "antifreeze" rule probably will not stop all
freezing transactions but expose
them to greater tax risks and cause
new techniques to be used instead.
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